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Abstract. This paper aims to bring together two separate threads in the 
formal study of epistemic change: belief revision and argumentation 
theories. Belief revision describes the way in which an agent is supposed to 
change his own mind, while argumentation deals with persuasive strategies 
employed to change the mind of other agents. Belief change and 
argumentation are two sides (cognitive and social) of the same epistemic 
coin. Argumentation theories are therefore incomplete, if they cannot be 
grounded in belief revision models – and vice versa. Nonetheless, so far the 
formal treatment of belief revision widely neglected any systematic 
comparison with argumentation theories. Such lack of integration poses 
severe limitations to our understanding of epistemic change, and more 
comprehensive models should instead be devised. After a short critical 
review of the literature (cf. 1), we outline an alternative model of belief 
revision whose main claim is the distinction between data and beliefs (cf. 
2), and we discuss in detail its expressivity with respect to argumentation 
(cf. 3): finally, we summarize our conclusions and future works on the 
interface between belief revision and argumentation (cf. 4).a b 
1 BELIEF REVISION WITHOUT 
ARGUMENTATION 
Following the seminal work in [10], belief revision has recently 
become an extremely active area of research at the confluence 
between AI, logic, cognitive science, and philosophy. 
Notwithstanding the impressive amount and quality of studies 
devoted to this topic, belief revision has been mainly addressed in 
a rather single-minded fashion, isolating the issue of belief change 
from other related features of cognitive processing. As remarked in 
[16], current theories of belief revision have been put forward and 
discussed in a sort of epistemological vacuum, without providing a 
more comprehensive account of epistemic states and dynamics. 
Moreover, the process of belief change has been usually conceived 
as an isolated activity, neglecting obvious connections with other 
cognitive tasks: e.g. inferential reasoning, communication, 
argumentation. On the contrary, we claim that belief revision 
should be investigated as a specific function (albeit a crucial one) 
in the cognitive processing of epistemic states, integrating formal 
models of belief change in a comprehensive epistemological 
theory, with systematic connections with related cognitive tasks. 
1.1 Limitations of current theories 
The AGM paradigm [10] has been the most influential model of 
belief revision so far, serving as a frame of reference for both 
refinements and criticisms of the original proposal. Roughly 
summarizing (see [14] for further discussion), this model was first 
conceived as an idealistic theory of rational belief change: belief 
states were characterized as sets of propositions (infinite and 
deductively closed), three basic types of change were described 
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(expansion, contraction, revision), and rationality was expressed by 
a set of postulates binding these operators. To decide between 
different outcomes of the revision process (i.e. different sets of 
propositions consistent with the rationality postulates), an ordering 
criterion was introduced in the original belief state, ranking 
propositions for their importance (epistemic entrenchment). 
This approach to belief revision fails to integrate with 
argumentation theories for two reasons: (1) it does not make any 
predictions or assumptions about how and why some propositions 
come to be believed, rather than others; (2) there is a deliberate 
lack of structural properties in the characterization of epistemic 
states. Argumentation theories capture the ways in which a desired 
change in the audience’s beliefs is brought about by the arguer: 
therefore, without an explicit theory of the reasons to believe 
something, the whole point of argumentation is lost. AGM-style 
approaches to belief revision simply lack the necessary internal 
structure to describe argumentative strategies. 
In this respect, the so called foundation theories of belief 
revision fare better than AGM, since they provide a precise 
account of the reasons supporting a given belief, e.g. using truth 
maintenance systems [5]. Similar proposals have also been 
advanced in the field of multi-agent systems [6, 8, 9]. 
Nevertheless, none of these theories explicitly address 
argumentation, and the structural properties of epistemic states are 
restricted to factual supports for the agent’s beliefs, in order to 
ensure an accurate weighting of unreliable and/or contrasting 
sources of information. Although such structures are essential to 
integrate belief revision and argumentation, they are not enough: a 
fairly rich picture of argumentative strategies must also include 
motivational and emotional features [4, 11, 12], not only factual 
credibility. We also claim that belief revision is affected by similar 
considerations, so that a more comprehensive cognitive model of 
epistemic change must be devised (cf. 2.1-2.4; see also [7, 9, 16]). 
2 DATA-ORIENTED BELIEF REVISION (DBR): 
AN ALTERNATIVE MODEL FOR 
COGNITIVE AGENTS 
The following sections provide a short outline of an alternative 
model of belief revision, i.e. Data-oriented Belief Revision (DBR): 
for further details, see [3, 14]. 
2.1 Data and beliefs: properties and interaction 
Two basic epistemic categories, data and beliefs, are put forward 
in this model, to account for the distinction between pieces of 
information that are simply gathered and stored by the agent 
(data), and pieces of information that the agent considers reliable 
bases for action, decision, and specific reasoning tasks, e.g. 
prediction and explanation (beliefs). Clearly, the latter are a subset 
of the former: the agent might well be aware of a datum that he 
does not believe (i.e. he does not consider reliable enough); on the 
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other hand, the agent should not be forced to forget (i.e. to lose as a 
datum) a piece of information which he temporarily rejects as a 
belief [3]. Moreover, a rejected piece of information retains 
significant epistemic properties (e.g. its own unreliability, and the 
reasons for it) that will often be crucial in future revisions and 
should be preserved by a formal model of belief change [6, 16]. 
The distinction between data and beliefs yields a number of 
relevant consequences for the formal study of epistemic dynamics: 
to start with, it leads to conceive belief change as a two-step 
process. Let us consider external belief change (cf. 2.3), by way of 
example. Whenever a new piece of evidence is acquired, either 
through perception or communication, it affects directly the agent’s 
data structure, and only indirectly his belief set. More precisely, the 
effects (if any) of the new datum on the agent’s beliefs depend (1) 
on its effects on the other data, and (2) on the process of belief 
selection applied by the agent over such data (cf. 2.2). The 
resulting multi-layered architecture of belief change has been 
christened as Data-oriented Belief Revision (DBR) in [14]. 
More generally, data and beliefs define the two basic cognitive 
layers  of the whole epistemic processing performed by the agent, 
as summarized in Figure 1. An exhaustive discussion of this 
general model is beyond the aim of this paper (see [14] for further 
details on DBR): here we will focus mainly on the treatment of 
data, with special reference to information update, data properties 
and assessment, and belief selection (cf. 2.2-2.4), since these are 
the features most directly involved in belief revision. However, it 
is important to keep in mind the overall epistemic processing, if we 
want to provide a formal model adequate to express belief change 
in cognitive agents. 
In DBR, data are selected as beliefs on the basis of their 
properties, i.e. the possible cognitive reasons to believe such data. 
Our model accounts for four distinct properties of data [2, 3, 14]: 
I. Relevance: a measure of the pragmatic utility of the datum, 
i.e. the number and values of the (pursued) goals that 
depends on that datum. 
II. Credibility: a measure of the number and values of all 
supporting data, contrasted with all conflicting data, down 
to external and internal sources; 
III. Importance: a measure of the epistemic connectivity of the 
datum, i.e. the number and values of the data that the agent 
will have to revise, should he revise that single one; 
IV. Likeability: a measure of the motivational appeal of the 
datum, i.e. the number and values of the (pursued) goals 
that are directly fulfilled by that datum. 
The assessment of credibility and importance is discussed in 
2.3, while the assessment of relevance and likeability is detailed in 
[14]. In DBR, credibility, importance and likeability determine the 
outcomes of belief selection, i.e. whether a candidate data is to be 
believed or not, and with which strength (cf. 2.2), while relevance 
is crucial in pre-selecting the sub-set of active data (focusing), i.e. 
determining which data in the agent’s data base are 
useful/appropriate for the current task, and should therefore be 
taken in consideration as candidate beliefs (more in-depth 
discussion on focusing is given in [14]). While relevance and 
likeability depend on a comparison between data and goals, 
credibility and importance basically depend on structural relations 
between data [6]. In fact, in DBR data bases are highly structured 
domains, best conceived as networks: data are represented as 
nodes, interconnected through characteristic functional relations 
(cf. 2.3), i.e. links in the network. 
The agent’s beliefs emerge from his data base through the 
selection process (cf. 2.2). Beliefs are characterized by strength, 
which reflects their implicit ordering. Strength is determined by the 
selection process from the values of credibility, importance, and 
relevance of the corresponding datum. Beliefs are organized in 
ordered sets, rather than networks [10, 14].  
The basic distinction between data and beliefs yields a rich 
picture of epistemic dynamics (Table 1). From a computational 
viewpoint, such distinction opens the way for blended approaches 
to implementation [14]: data structures present remarkable 
similarities with Bayesian networks and neural networks, while 
belief sets are a well-known hallmark of AGM-style belief revision 
[10]. Moreover, data and beliefs in DBR are conceived as different 
stages, roles, and functions in the processing of internal epistemic 
states, to be accounted for in the agent architecture [14]. 
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Figure 1.   Epistemic processing in Data-oriented Belief Revision: general outline 
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Table 1. Data and beliefs in DBR: an overview 
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2.2 Belief selection in DBR 
Once the informational values of the available data are assessed 
(cf. 2.3), a selection over such data is performed, to determine the 
subset of reliable information (i.e. beliefs) and their degree of 
strength. Every time new information is gathered by the agent, 
modifying his data network, the belief selection takes place anew, 
possibly (but not necessarily) changing the agent’s belief set. 
This process of belief selection in DBR regulates the interaction 
from data to beliefs, determining (1) what data are to be believed, 
given the current informational state, and (2) which degree of 
strength is to be assigned to each of them. The outcome of belief 
selection is determined by the informational values of the 
candidate data (credibility, importance, likeability) and by the 
specific nature of the agent’s selection process. 
In this model, the agent’s belief selection is represented by a 
mathematical system, including a condition C, a threshold k, and a 
function F. Condition and threshold together express the minimal 
informational requirements for a datum to be selected as belief. 
The function assigns a value of strength to the accepted beliefs. 
Both C and F are mathematical functions with credibility and/or 
importance and/or likeability as their arguments, but they do not 
need to be identical. Given a datum φ, cφ, iφ, lφ are, respectively, its 
credibility, importance, and likeability. Let  represents the set of 
the agent’s beliefs, and Bsφ represents the belief φ with strength s. 
Hence the general form of the selection process is: 
if C(cφ, iφ, lφ) ≤ k then Bsφ,∉ B 
if C(cφ, iφ, lφ) > k then Bsφ,∈ B with sφ = F(cφ, iφ, lφ) 
The setting of C, F and k is an individual parameter, which 
might vary in different agents (cf. 2.4). Examples of individual 
variation in belief selection are the following: 
C: cφ > k k: 0.5 F: cφ 
C: cφ > k k: 0.6 F: (cφ + iφ + lφ) / 3 
C: cφ > k × (1 - lφ) k: 0.8 F: cφ × (iφ + lφ) 
All these parametrical settings assign to data credibility the 
main role in determining belief selection, but they do so in widely 
different ways. The first parametrical setting expresses a 
thoroughly realistic attitude towards belief selection, regardless of 
any considerations about importance or likeability. At the same 
time, the minimal threshold is set at a quite tolerant level of 
credibility (0.5). The threshold is slightly higher in the second 
parametrical setting, and the condition is identical: on the whole, 
this reflects a more cautious acceptance of reliable data. But once a 
datum is indeed accepted as belief, its strength is now calculated 
taking in account also importance and likeability, in contrast to the 
previous setting. The same happens in the third parametrical 
setting, although along different lines. Here the threshold is 
extremely high (0.8), but the condition is influenced by likeability 
as well: assuming that likeability ranges in the interval [0, 1], here 
the minimal threshold over credibility is conversely proportional to 
the likeability of the datum (e.g. it is 0.08 for a datum with 
likeability 0.9 vs. 0.72 for a datum with likeability 0.1). That 
expresses a systematic bias towards the acceptance of likeable (i.e. 
pleasant) data, in spite of their credibility. In other words, these 
parametrical settings define three agents with different 
personalities, with respect to belief selection: a tolerant full realist 
(the first), a prudent open-minded realist (the second), and a 
wishful thinking agent (the third). 
Allowing several parametrical settings in belief selection (as 
well as in other features of DBR, cf. 2.4) serves to capture 
individual variation in epistemic dynamics, i.e. specifying different 
strategies of belief change for different agents and/or for different 
contexts and tasks1. It also shows that, although the selection 
process in DBR is just a mathematical simplification of the 
cognitive process of belief selection, it is extremely flexible and 
expressive, since we can manipulate and set condition, function 
and threshold in such a way to express different selection 
strategies, with an high degree of sophistication. Moreover, a 
mathematically straightforward treatment of individual variation 
will prove essential for investigating evolutionary dynamics in 
shaping belief revision strategies in multi-agent systems, e.g. 
applying genetic algorithms over population of agents with 
randomized internal settings (cf. 4). 
2.3 Information update and data assessment 
Belief revision is usually triggered by information update either on 
a fact or on a source: the agent receives a new piece of 
information, rearranges his data structure accordingly, and possibly 
changes his belief set, depending on the belief selection process. 
Information update specifies the way in which new evidences are 
integrated in the agent’s data structure. We define external belief 
selection the process of epistemic change triggered by information 
update, in contrast to internal belief revision, i.e. belief change 
initiated by inferring a new piece of information through reasoning 
(on internal belief revision, see [14]). 
Data structures are conceived as networks of nodes (data), 
linked together by characteristic relations. For the purposes of the 
present discussion, it will suffice to define three different types of 
data relations: support, contrast, and union. 
I. Support: φ supports ψ (φ,⇒,ψ) iff cψ ∝ cφ, the credibility of 
ψ is directly proportional to the credibility of φ. 
II. Contrast: φ contrasts ψ (φ,⊥ ,ψ) iff cψ ∝ 1/cφ, the credibility 
of ψ is conversely proportional to the credibility of φ. 
III. Union: φ and ψ are united (φ,&,ψ) iff cφ and cψ jointly (not 
separately) determine the credibility of another datum γ. 
New external information generates not only a datum 
concerning its content, but also data concerning source attribution 
and source reliability, and the structural relations among them. 
More precisely, information update brings together: 
I. a datum concerning the content (object datum, O-datum); 
II. a datum identifying the information source (S-datum); 
III. a datum concerning the reliability of the source (R-datum). 
These data are closely related, since the credibility of the new 
information depends on the jointed credibility of the other two 
                              
1 Individual variation is a major concern also for argumentation studies, 
e.g. as a way of framing a theory of personality in multi-agent platforms 
(see for instance [13]). 
8 
data: i.e. the union of the S-datum and the R-datum supports the O-
datum (Fig. 2). Once an agent has been told by x that φ holds, his 
confidence in φ will depend on the reliability he assigns to x, 
provided he is sure enough that the source of φ was indeed x. The 
environmental input is characterized by a content φ (e.g. its 
propositional meaning), a source x (e.g. another agent), and a noise 
n (affecting both source identification and content understanding)2. 
 
src(x,φ)
S-datum: src(x, φ)
R-datum: rel(x)
O-datum: φ
New relation:
(src(x, φ) & rel(x))⇒ φinp(x, φ, n)
rel(x)
φ
 
Figure 2.   Information update: integrating new external data 
 
While pragmatic relevance and emotional likeability of a datum 
are further discussed in [3, 14], here we focus on credibility and 
importance. The credibility of a given datum depends on the 
credibility of its supports, weighted against the credibility of its 
contrasts [3, 8, 16]. Each agent must be equipped with a specific 
algorithm to determine such value. Although this algorithm is an 
individual parameter (different agents can use different heuristics 
for data assessment), it must obey the general definition of support 
and contrast relations. This is an example of credibility algorithm3: 
cα = (1 - ∏µ ∈ Sα (1 - c
µ)) × ∏χ ∈ Kα (1 - c
χ) 
with Sα = the set of all data supporting α 
Kα = the set of all data contrasting α 
Support and contrast determine the credibility of one relatum in 
terms of the credibility of the other. Union takes in account the 
credibility of both relata at the same time, in order to assess the 
credibility of a third datum – either supported or contrasted. An 
example is given by information update (Fig. 2): the credibility of 
the O-datum depends on the credibility of the union of S-datum 
and R-datum. Therefore we need to specify a union algorithm for 
each agent [14]: i.e. a procedure to assess the credibility of (φ & 
ψ), given the credibility of φ and ψ. For instance: 
cφ & ψ = min(cφ, cψ) 
Now we have enough elements to provide a quantitative 
description of information update, and not only a qualitative one. 
The credibility of the O-datum will depend on the credibility of the 
union of the S-datum (here with c = 1, assuming noiseless 
communication by hypothesis) and the R-datum, weighted against 
the credibility of all contrasting evidences (if any), according to the 
credibility algorithm of that particular agent.  The assessment of 
source reliability is thoroughly discussed in [3, 8, 14]. 
Importance assessment in DBR is formally similar to credibility 
assessment, although different features of the datum are considered 
here: importance measures the connectivity of the datum (i.e. its 
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epistemic value: how many data explains and are explained by that 
datum), therefore it depends on the number and credibility of all 
related data – without distinction between supports and contrasts. 
An importance algorithm (determining the agent’s general strategy 
in evaluating importance) and a threshold (ranged in [0, 1], 
selecting which data are good enough to influence the importance 
estimate) are defined for each agent, and they are both individual 
parameters (cf. 2.4). In addition, importance assessment requires 
also to specify a certain depth, i.e. the number of steps (forward or 
backward) in data networks considered by the agent in assessing 
importance. Provided that data are typically inserted in chains of 
sequential supports (e.g., α ⇒ β ⇒ γ ⇒ δ ⇒ ε, etc.), not all data in 
the chains will be relevant to assess the importance of each node, 
although they are all related to each other: the number of nodes 
actually considered depends on the depth parameter (in DBR, a 
positive integer) characteristic of that particular agent. An example 
of parametrical setting for importance evaluation is the following: 
µ < 5 iφ = µ /5 × (1 – ∏ ψ ,∈ Nφ (1 – c
ψ)) 
µ,≥ 5  iφ = 1 – ∏ ψ ,∈ Nφ (1 – c
ψ) 
with Nφ = the set of all data related to φ in depth λ 
µ = the number of data in Nφ with cψ ≥ w 
Threshold w = 0.3  
Depth λ = 2 
In this case, the agent will apply his importance algorithm to all 
related active data within two steps in the data network (depth) and 
with credibility equal or greater than 0.3 (threshold). Different 
settings of these parameters can be used to express different 
individual attitudes in importance assessment (cf. 3.5). 
2.4 Individual variation in DBR: principles and 
parameters 
The DBR model is based on a conceptual distinction between 
principles and parameters [14]. Principles are general and 
qualitative in nature, defining the common features which 
characterize epistemic processing in every agent. Parameters, 
instead, are individual and quantitative, specifying in which 
fashion and measure each agent applies the universal principles of 
DBR. The cognitive and social framework of the model is captured 
by its principles, while individual variation is represented through 
parametrical setting. 
For instance, the overall two-step dynamic of belief revision is a 
universal principle, while the mathematical nature of the selection 
process is an individual parameter. Credibility assessment will 
always be positively affected by supporting evidence and 
negatively affected by contrasting data, but the credibility 
algorithm might vary from one agent to another. All agents 
perform inferential deduction at the level of beliefs, but the specific 
axioms applied are a matter of individual variation – and so on. An 
example of the way in which parameters can be used to express 
individual variation in belief selection strategies was provided in 
2.4. Moreover, a further mathematical sketch of parametrical 
setting is given in 3.5, to illustrate part of their impact over 
argumentation. 
3 ARGUMENTATION AND DBR 
This section is devoted to highlight several connections between 
DBR and argumentation theories [1, 4, 11, 13, 17]: the impact of 
rhetorical arguments over the audience’s beliefs (cf. 3.1), the 
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different stages in Toulmin’s model of argumentation (cf. 3.2), the 
treatment of defeasible reasoning (cf. 3.3), the role of 
contradictions in arguments (cf. 3.4), and the effects of individual 
parameters over argumentation strategies and outcomes (cf. 3.5). 
3.1 Rhetoric and audience’s beliefs 
Aristotle’s definition of rhetorical argument characterizes it as 
being especially focused on the audience’s beliefs, rather than 
general acceptability. This definition is usually referred to in 
formal studies of rhetorical argumentation, e.g. [11], where the 
need for a model of belief revision (and more generally belief 
processing) is quite self-evident. However, as far as cognitive 
agents are concerned, even the most general and uncontroversial 
argument requires a process of belief revision in the mind of the 
audience: it is not the fact that p follows from q and q is the case 
which makes me believe p, but rather my beliefs that “p follows 
from q” and “q is the case”. An integrated framework naturally 
emphasizes that any form of argumentation (including strictly 
logical ones) must be strongly focused on the audience’s beliefs. 
In our model, a crucial factor in determining whether a new 
piece of information will be accepted or rejected as belief is its 
importance [10, 14], i.e. the degree of connectivity (integration) of 
the new datum in the audience’s data structure (cf. 2.3). An 
effective argument not only presents new information to the 
audience, but also provides the relevant connections with data 
already available to (and possibly believed by) that audience. Such 
connections vouch for the plausibility of the new datum [3] and are 
crucial in persuading the audience to accept it. In data networks, 
we distinguish two cases of argumentation through plausibility: 
I. Self-evident data: the new datum is presented as following 
from what the audience already knew – the datum had not 
yet been inferred, but it might have been, and the audience 
is likely to remark: «Sure! Of course! Obviously!» etc.; 
II. Explanatory data: the new datum is presented as 
supporting and explaining data already available – since 
such explanation was missing so far, it produces reactions 
like: «Now I see! That’s why! I knew it!» etc. 
This distinction is easily represented by a structured data-
domain: in DBR, self-evident data are data with a high number of 
supports, while explanatory data in turn support many other data 
(Fig. 3). Different degrees of self-evidence and explanatory power 
are expressed by epistemic importance (cf. 2.1). 
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Figure 3.   Two plausibility arguments: self-evident and explanatory data 
3.2 Toulmin revis(it)ed 
One of the most influential account of argumentation is the so 
called Toulmin’s model [17], which analyzes six features of an 
argument: data, claim, warrant, backing, qualifier, rebuttal. The 
data are the facts (e.g. John loved his wife) which support the 
arguer’s claim (e.g. John did not murder her), while the warrant 
ensures the connection between data and claim (e.g. people do not 
murder the ones they love), on the basis of some backing (e.g. 
murderers hate their victims); the qualifier specifies to what extend 
the warrant applies to the claim (e.g. usually), and the rebuttal 
describes special conditions which undermine the warrant (e.g. 
John is in bad need of money and will benefit from her insurance). 
This schema is liable of immediate implementation in our 
model of belief revision, since it defines a specific data structure 
(Fig. 4). The union of data and warrant supports the claim, and the 
warrant is in turn supported by its backing and contrasted by the 
rebuttal, i.e. supports to the rebuttal make the warrant less reliable. 
The qualifier is represented by the degree of credibility assigned to 
the claim by this data structure – while more sophisticated models 
of source integration might also distinguish between the claim’s 
credibility and the confidence expressed by the arguer [8]. 
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Figure 4.   Toulmin’s model in data structure 
 
This convergence is not surprising, since our model is built over 
the intuition that epistemic processing requires “reasons to believe” 
[3, 5, 7], and indeed argumentation is mainly concerned with the 
manipulation of reasons in order to change the audience’s beliefs. 
However, it is worth noticing that other theories of belief revision 
fail to incorporate Toulmin’s model: e.g., in the AGM approach 
there is no way to capture similar argumentative structures, without 
undertaking major modification of the model. 
3.3 Defeasible reasoning in data networks 
Argumentation is often modeled in the formal framework of 
defeasible reasoning [1, 16], distinguishing between two kinds of 
defeaters (i.e. possible counterarguments against a reason-schema): 
rebutting vs. undercutting defeaters. Applying the terminology 
proposed in [17], a rebutting defeater is any reason which directly 
denies the claim of the argument, while an undercutting defeater is 
a reason which undermine the validity of the relevant warrant. 
In our model, different defeaters target different nodes in the 
data network (Fig. 5): rebutting defeaters are data which contrast 
the claim-node (e.g. John has been seen shooting his wife), while 
undercutting defeaters are data contrasting the warrant-node (e.g. 
jealousy can make you kill the ones you love most). Moreover, a 
third category of defeaters can be expressed: premise defeaters, i.e. 
reasons which contrast the data-node (e.g. John did not love his 
wife). Undercutting and premise defeaters have similar function 
but different targets: the former attack the connection between data 
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and claim, while the latter question the statement of fact which 
support the conclusion4. 
W
C
Rebutting defeaters
(Direct defea ters)
Premise defeaters Undercutting defeaters
(Rebuttals)
D
 
Figure 5.   Defeasible reasoning in data structure 
3.4 Revising contradictions in argumentation 
AGM-style approaches to belief revision exclude contradictions in 
principle, assuming belief states to be fully consistent – an 
untenable assumption, as far as cognitive agents are concerned. On 
the contrary, argumentation theories have been quite successful in 
handling inconsistency and conflicts [1, 4, 16, 17], since the very 
idea of defeating an argument implies that such argument can be 
showed to be inconsistent with respect to a better one. Moreover, 
the AGM paradigm assumes belief states to be deductively closed, 
therefore infinite. This is not only a computational problem, but 
also a conceptual mistake: cognitive agents do not derive all the 
consequences from available data not only because they are 
resource-bounded [14, 19], but mainly because they have no need 
to derive irrelevant consequences from accepted claims. 
In DBR, epistemic states are both finite and deductively open, 
and there is no universal insurance against contradictions. Instead, 
we are able to capture two relevant distinction concerning 
inconsistency: implicit vs. explicit contradictions, and data 
contrasts vs. beliefs contradictions. Agents are likely to entertain a 
certain number of implicitly contradictory beliefs, i.e. beliefs from 
which a contradiction could be derived, although the agent has not 
yet done so. As long as the contradiction remains implicit, the 
agent has no problem in handling it. In fact, one of the most 
common strategy in argumentation consists in confronting the 
audience with their own contradictions, i.e. forcing them to draw 
contradictory conclusions from what they already believe. 
In data structures, contrast relations capture contradictions 
between data (cf. 2.3). Such contradictions are actually beneficial 
to the agent, since they provide him with crucial information on the 
credibility of both relata. A contradiction needs to be solved only if 
it arises at the level of beliefs, i.e. if the selection process (cf. 2.2) 
accepts two contrasting data as beliefs. This is rare, since 
credibility plays a crucial role in belief selection, and the 
credibility of contrasting data is conversely proportional (cf. 2.3). 
However, under specific circumstances (e.g. a selection which 
emphasizes importance and likeability over credibility) it might 
happen that an agent is confronted with contradictory beliefs. In 
this case, the contradiction is solved through reasoning, applying 
an axiom to reject one of the contradictory beliefs, or both. 
Contradiction management is further discussed in [14]. Here we 
want to emphasize that rational agents are not safe from 
contradictions for some benevolent ‘law of nature’: they are rather 
                              
4
 Here we follow the terminology used in [16], but actually the expression 
‘rebutting defeater’ is quite misleading, when compared with Toulmin’s 
model. The rebuttal, as defined in [17], specifies the conditions which 
undermine the validity of the warrant, not of the claim – i.e. rebuttals are 
in fact undercutting defeaters. So the expression direct defeaters would 
be less ambiguous, to indicate defeaters which directly affect the claim. 
equipped to handle contradictions efficiently, e.g. exploiting the 
informational value of contrasting evidences. If we fail to 
acknowledge inconsistency in belief change, we miss the core of 
argumentation: weighting against each other contradictory claims. 
3.5 Parameters and argumentation 
In DBR, parameters (cf. 2.2 and 2.4) provide a computational 
description of individual variation [14]. They also have 
consequences over the treatment of argumentation, capturing the 
relevant distinction between local and global persuasion, and the 
multi-layered nature of argumentative strategies. 
An argument can either aims to change single beliefs in the 
mind of the audience (local persuasion), or it might address the 
basic processes which define the outcome of belief revision for that 
audience (global persuasion). Whenever persuasive argumentation 
is a major issue (e.g. political campaigns, advertising, religious 
events), global persuasion is the key feature: it is not enough to 
change some specific beliefs, the arguer is basically trying to make 
the audience accept a different way of thinking – that is, different 
revision procedures, to be applied autonomously from now on. 
Local and global strategies are grounded in our model, 
respectively, in argumentation over data network and 
argumentation over parameters. The examples discussed in 3.1-3.4 
are instances of local persuasion, which attack or support nodes in 
the data structure. On the contrary, global persuasion questions the 
validity of individual parameters concerning belief revision, e.g. 
the selection process («You should not pay so much attention to 
explanatory power, otherwise you are prone to wishful thinking!»), 
the assessment of data values («Do not underestimate contrasting 
evidences, or you will be biased toward confirmation!»), the 
reliability assigned to new sources («Why do you trust so much 
somebody you does not know?») [14]. 
Perhaps the most famous instance of the interplay between 
belief revision parameters, argumentation and global persuasion is 
from the Gospels: that is, the incredulity of St Thomas. When 
Jesus, after his resurrection, appeared for the first time to the 
apostles, Thomas was not there. Once he had been told of the 
miracle by his companions, he refused to believe their account, 
claiming that “unless I see in his hands the print of the nails, and 
place my finger in the mark of the nails, and place my hand in his 
side, I will not believe” (St John, 20: 25). This bold statement was 
challenged when Jesus appeared again, and explicitly insisted that 
Thomas should probe Jesus’ wounds with his incredulous finger. 
After that, the apostle was convinced and repentant, but Jesus was 
after a global persuasion, rather than a local one. Hence his final 
comment: “Have you believed because you have seen me? Blessed 
are those who have not seen and yet believe” (St John, 20: 29). 
In this episode a whole attitude (skepticism) is stigmatized as 
inadequate within a given context (matters of faith), and the 
misbehaving agent is required for the future to apply different 
parameters to his processes of belief selection and change. The 
opposite attitude is exemplified by Mary Magdalene, who 
immediately believed in the resurrection of Jesus once he was told 
by him, although she was not able to distinguish his features and 
his voice: the testimony of a stranger standing next to the sepulcher 
of Jesus was enough for her to believe in the miracle. Both these 
attitudes can be captured (in a simplified form) within the 
framework of DBR, as the computational analogous of Mary 
Magdalene and St Thomas summarized in Table 2. In the DBR 
counterpart of the biblical episode, the argumentative strategy 
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applied by Jesus on Thomas would aim to make him shift his 
parameters towards the ones of Mary, i.e. developing a more 
trustful epistemic attitude through several minor changes: e.g. a 
less pessimistic assessment of credibility value (the first two 
parameters), more refined processes for assessing importance (the 
third, fourth and fifth parameter), a less realistic process of belief 
selection (the sixth, seventh and sixth parameter), and more 
reliance in unknown sources of information (the last parameter 
listed in Table 2). 
 
Table 2. Parameters in DBR and argumentation: 
Mary Magdalene vs. St Thomas 
 TRUSTFUL 
(Mary Magdalene) 
SKEPTIC 
(St Thomas) 
Credibility 
alg. 
cα = (1 - ∏σ ∈ Sα (1 - c
σ)) 
   × ∏ε ∈ Kα (1 - c
ε) 
cσ = prσ × ∏ε ∈ Kσ (1 - pr
ε) 
   with σ ∈ S 
cα = 1 - ∏σ ∈ Sα (1 - c
σ) 
   with α ∉ S 
Union alg. cα&β =  min(cα, cβ) cα&β =  cα × cβ 
Importance alg. 
µ < 5, iφ = µ /5 × 
   (1 - ∏ ψ ∈ Nφ (1 - c
ψ)) 
µ ≥ 5, iφ = 1 - ∏ ψ ∈ Nφ (1 - c
ψ) 
µ < 5, iφ = µ /5 × 
   (1 - ∏ ψ ∈ Nφ (1 - c
ψ)) 
µ ≥ 5, iφ = 1 - ∏ ψ ∈ Nφ (1 - c
ψ) 
Depth λ 2 1 
Consid. thres. 
w 
0.3 0.6 
Condition C cφ / (1 - iφ) cφ 
Accept. thres. 
k 
0.6 0.8 
Function F cφ + iφ – (cφ × iφ) cφ 
Reliab. default 0.7 0.3 
 
Finally, parameters play a crucial role in any instance of 
argumentation, since the arguer is required to understand, at least 
partially, the parameters governing belief revision in his audience. 
This reflects the multi-layered nature of argumentation: for the 
arguer to be effective, it is not enough to figure out the audience’s 
beliefs (the data structure and the resulting belief set), but also the 
way in which beliefs are processed (the audience’s parameters on 
belief revision, e.g. how they assess data values, how they select 
beliefs from data, etc.). Factual evidences are useless, if the 
audience do not care for credibility in belief selection; on the other 
hand, alluring picture of highly desirable states of things does not 
work with matter-of-fact types – and so on. Formal models of 
belief change which fail to account for individual variation are 
implying that every audience will have identical reactions to the 
same base of data: an highly untenable assumption [2, 4, 14, 17]. 
4 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
The integrated framework sketched here strongly supports a 
general methodological claim: a model of belief revision, in order 
to deal effectively with argumentation, must ensure a proper 
degree of structural analysis – i.e. it must emphasizes the 
relational properties which characterize epistemic processing, 
rather than its overall principles. Ordering criteria over 
propositions or sets, like in AGM-style approaches, are not 
expressive enough to model argumentation – nor belief revision. 
Therefore, the main implication of this preliminary proposal is 
to initiate a systematic effort of integrating research areas 
necessarily connected with each other, i.e. argumentation studies 
and belief revisions, but that only rarely have been so far modeled 
within the same framework [7, 16]. Even more important, the DBR 
theory presented here constitutes a first step towards formal and 
computational models of epistemic change (both intra- and inter-
agents) able to fully express complex cognitive and social 
dynamics affecting belief revision in multi-agent systems, in 
contrast with the idealistic approach which dominated this field up 
to now (see also analogous considerations in [3, 14, 16]). 
In our future work we intend to refine the DBR model of belief 
revision (e.g. extending the computational treatment of data 
properties to motivational and emotional features, i.e. relevance 
and likeability [3, 12, 14]), to provide more systematic connections 
with argumentation theories [1, 4, 7, 11, 13, 17], and move towards 
implementation in multi-agent systems, especially for agent-based 
social simulation [6, 9, 14]. As a starting point, we plan to use 
argumentation tasks as testing ground for belief revision 
algorithms, and vice versa – building on the general results 
discussed here. Finally, we also aim to investigate a more radical 
hypothesis concerning the connection between belief revision and 
argumentation: namely, the idea of modeling the whole process of 
epistemic change as a form of internal argumentation [3, 16], as 
long ago suggested in developmental psychology by Jean Piaget 
[15] and Lev Vygotsky [18]. 
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